Regulation of Pay-Cable and Closed
Circuit Movies: No Room in

the Wasteland
Since the passage of the Communications Act,' new modes of communication have developed, many of which are not clearly, or not
at all, within the categories over which the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) was granted regulatory powers. While community
antenna television (CATV) has received the lion's share of regulatory,
judicial, and scholarly attention, 2 several of the other new media present
similar problems.
After seventeen years of rule making proceedings, 3 the FCC in 1972
authorized over-the-air broadcasting on a per program charge basis. 4
The FCC is now considering subscription cable television, 5 and has
proposed rules that would severely restrict the type and timing of programming pay-cable could present.6 At the same time, the Commission
has refused to assert jurisdiction over the showing of movies and
sporting events, by leased-wire arrangements with telephone companies,
in hotel rooms in major cities, while suggesting possible future regu1 47 U.S.C. § 151 et sec. (1970).
2 See, e.g., Barnett, Cable Television and Media Concentration, 22 STAN. L. REv. 221
(1970); Botein, Access to Cable Television, 57 CoRNar-r L. REv. 419 (1972); Park, Prospects
for Cable in the 100 Largest Television Markets, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGr. Sct. 130 (1972);

Note, Cable Television and the First Amendment, 71 CoLum. L. REv. 1008 (1971); Note,
The FederalCommunications Commission and Regulation of CATV, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 117

(1968).
3 The FCC's rule making proceeding in Docket No. 11279 was begun in 1955. See R.
HORTON, To PAY OR NoT TO PAY 1-6 (1960); Brown, The Subscription Television Controversy: A Continuing Symptom of Federal Communication Commission Ills, 24

FED.

CoAr. B.J. 259, 260-64 (1971).
4 Blonder-Tongue Broadcasting Corp., 25 P &F RAnio REG. 2d 104 (F.C.C. Jul. 26, 1972).
This authorization followed adoption of severe restrictions on the programming that
could be shown through subscription television, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.641-76.644 (1972), and
judicial approval of those regulations. See National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420
F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 897 U.S. 922 (1970).
5 Pay-cable consists of offering TV programming to viewers via cable at a per program
or per channel charge. The wires carrying the signals may be leased from a common
carrier, laid by the pay-cable operation, or shared with a CATV operation. There is no
necessity that any broadcast signals be carried by the cable subscription television (STV)
operator.
6 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1972).
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lation if competition with commercial television becomes more effec7
tive.
This comment examines the legal and logical bases for the FCC's
assertion of jurisdiction over pay-cable television. After reviewing the
origins and purposes of the FCC's regulatory authority, the comment
discusses the nature of ancillary jurisdiction and analyzes the impact
of new media on regulatory policies. This analysis suggests that the
FCC should regulate neither pay-cable nor closed-circuit movies.
I.

REGULATORY RATIONALES

Regulation of radio was prompted by broadcast interference. 8 Without frequency allocation, two or more users often attempted to broadcast simultaneously on the same frequency, and as a result, neither could
be understood. The Radio Act of 1912, 9 was designed to enable the
Navy to use radio for safety and navigation purposes free from interference, and, as a byproduct, to reduce interference generally. 10 The
Act required radio station operators to obtain licenses from the Secretary of Commerce specifying the wave length or lengths to be used and
the hours of use."- Because, however, the act did not limit the grant
of licenses, all applicants meeting the statutory criteria had to be
2
licensed even though there were no frequencies or hours available.'
Interference, therefore, could not be abated, and, even before the great
increase in interference brought about by the advent of commercial
radio broadcasting in 1920,18 Navy Secretary Daniels had declared that
government monopoly of radio was required. 14
Following a plethora of congressional commentary on the bedlam
then prevailing on the airwaves, 5 Congress passed the Radio Act of
1927,16 creating the Federal Radio Commission and investing it with
7 Sterling Manhattan Cable Television, Inc. v. New York Tel. Co., 26 P & F RADIO REG.
2d 610 (F.C.C. Jan. 17, 1973).
8 L. WroTE, THE AMERICAN RADIO 128-31 (1947).
9 37 Stat. 302 (1912), repealed, 44 Stat. 1174 (1927).
10 S. Rep. No. 698, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1912); Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 J. LAw & ECON. 1, 2 (1959).
11 Coase, supra note 10, at 2-3.
32 Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (App. D.C. 1923); United States v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926).
13 Between the first of March and the first of November, 1922, the number of radio
broadcast stations increased from 60 to 564. Coase, supra note 10, at 4. By March 1927,
the number of broadcast stations was 732. FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 2
(1927).
14 Coase, supra note 10, at 3.
15 See, e.g., 68 Cong. Rec. 32, 1704, 2576, 3029 (1926-1927); S. Rep. No. 772, 69th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1926).
L6 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), repealed, 48 Stat. 1102 (1934).
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broad regulatory powers. The Act conditioned the grant of a license
on waiver of any claim to any other use of the airwaves,17 and limited
the license term to a renewable three years. This licensing program
effectively reduced interference and was incorporated without substantial change into the Communications Act of 1934,18 which transferred the Radio Commission's powers to the newly created Federal
Communications Commission. 9
Early Supreme Court decisions recognized that the interference of
some uses of radio with others, rather than a congressional interest in
dispersion of communications facilities, spurred Congress to regulate
radio:
The plight into which radio fell prior to 1927 was attributable
to certain basic facts about radio as a means of communicationits facilities are limited; they are not available to all who may wish
to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not large enough to
accommodate everybody. There is a fixed natural limitation upon
the number of stations that can operate without interfering with
one another. Regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its development as traffic control was to the development of the auto20
mobile.
Although, as Professor Coase noted some forty-seven years after the
advent of radio regulation in America, radio frequencies are no more
"scarce" than any other resource, and multiple use and interference
was attributable to the lack of private ownership, 21 it was clear that
Congress believed that scarcity was the predicate for regulation.
17 Coase, supra note 10, at 5--6. This provision was taken from an earlier joint resolution,

S.J. Res. 125, 67 Cong. Rec. 12959, 13046 (1926), and is presently contained in § 304 of
the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. (1970). The language of this provision seems
directed at complaints of deprivation of property without due process occasioned by earlier
regulatory efforts. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.& 113 (1877). Proponents of radio
regulation in the 1920's, aware of those complaints, carefully couched their urgings in
terms of the public nature of radio. E.g., FouRTH NATIONAL RADIO CONFERENCE, PROCEEDINGS AND RECOMIMNDATIONS FOR REGULA7ON oF RADIo 6 (1925) (remarks of Herbert
Hoover), quoted in W. EuMRY, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS OF BROADCASnNG 8
(1969).
18 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
19 The legislative history of the Communications Act indicates that Title III was
premised on the same bases and sought the same ends as the Radio Act of 1927. The radio
regulation title was included in the 1934 Act to centralize regulatory control of broadcasters and common carriers by wire or radio in a single administrative agency. S. Rep.
No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
20 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
21 Coase, supra note 10, at 14. Professor Coase argues that the problem of allocating
radio resources could better have been managed by creation of private property rights
in frequendes. Interference could then have been controlled in much the same way as
interference with the use of tangible property is controlled, through actions to abate
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It was necessary to devise a mechanism for allocating frequencies,
which were believed to be too "scarce" to allow all "desirable" uses.
The FCC has jurisdiction to determine the types of programs for which
radio will be used and the geographical location of the licensed stations
only because of this necessity.22 To prevent interference, it is necessary
to limit the number of radio users; rather than allow the most valuable
use of any frequency to be determined by having potential users bid
for, and the highest bidder pay for, the use of an interference-free
frequency, 23 Congress determined that frequencies would be dispensed
without charge. The problem, then, was to determine what use would
be the most valuable. First it was determined that radio should be used
to promote local expression. 24 Therefore, by limiting broadcast power,
licenses restrict the area to which a station can broadcast and allow
more stations to broadcast, each to a localized audience. Second, Congress decided that some restriction should be imposed on what the
broadcaster said, since the broadcaster was supposed to serve the public. 25 Congress listed a few types of speech that broadcasters could not
air but left to the FCC the decision whether licensing a particular
broadcaster served the public's interest in radio use.26 Thus, local
nuisances, to redress trespasses, etc. Id. at 25-27. The present system of allocating radio
frequency use results in misallocation due to the government's inability to gain sufficient
information about all possible uses for all frequencies and from the difficulty of assigning

relative values to uses absent a monetary measure. Id. at 18. Professor Coase also notes
the lack of evidence indicating that it is less costly to regulate frequency allocation than
it would be to develop and operate a market for such allocation. Id. at 18-19.
There does appear to be one case, decided just before the passage of the joint resolution
declaring the absence of property rights in frequencies, that implicitly recognized such
rights and granted nuisance relief for interference. Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting
Station (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. 1926), noted in 68 CONG. REc. 216 (1926). Professor Coase
concludes that, but for the adoption of federal regulatory schemes, the courts would have
worked out solutions to the problems of interference, using notions of private property
rights. Coase, supra note 10, at 30-31.
22 See Hearings on HR. 5589 Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, 47-52, 128-30, 149-76, 206-14 (1926). Congressmen
frequently expressed preference for achieving the greatest possible diversity in both aspects
of allocation-a little something for everyone-and the Commission has attempted to
comply. See FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Co., 349 U.S. 358 (1955); Newman Broadcasting
Co., 11 F.C.C. 1369, 1377 (1947).
23 See Coase, supra note 10.
24 See Hearings,supra note 22, at 40, 128-30, 207-11.
25 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-91 (1969).
26 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970); 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1970). The provisions presently in force
were taken from the 1927 Act. Although the Radio Act of 1927 explicitly eschewed any
intent to authorize program censorship, see 47 U.S.C. § 326; Coase, supra note 10, at 6,
it banned obscene language, required identification of persons paying for or furnishing
programs, prohibited rebroadcasting programs without the originating station's consent,
and mandated provision of equal time for political announcements. Coase, supra note
10, at 6.
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expression and program diversity are not independent regulatory goals
but are, instead, only standards to guide the Commission in allocating
the radio spectrum among competing uses.
Absent a direct market determination of what the public values,
the Commission has inquired whether programming meets the Commissioners' idea of what the public generally is interested in hearing and
whether programming conforms to community sentiment as determined
by local surveys.27 The premise for regulating broadcasters' programming is the need, without economic determinants, to ensure that
public, not private, interests are served. It seems, however, that economic determinants exist that can ensure, more accurately and less
expensively than the FCC that the public interest is served. The
broadcaster who sells commercial advertising to support his programming wants to derive the greatest possible profit from such advertising.
To maximize advertising revenue, the broadcaster must reach the greatest possible audience. It is thus in the commercial broadcaster's interest
to present programming that the greatest number of persons desires to
28
see or hear.
II.

EXTENSION OF JURISDICTION TO NEw MEDIA

The first commercial community antenna television system in the
United States was constructed in 1950 in Lansford, Pennsylvania. 29 For
the next decade CATV systems limited their activities almost exclusively to the importation of signals from larger urban areas into small
communities, such as Lansford, 0 that otherwise would have had no
local station or only poor reception of distant stations' signals.3 1 In
27 The FCC has looked at programming in individual, e.g., Mayflower Broadcasting
Corp., 8 F.C.C. 33 (1940), and comparative, see Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 5 P & F RAvio REG. 2d 1901 (1965), proceedings to determine whether a
broadcast license applicant offers communications of sufficient importance, see Young
People's Ass'n, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938), and responsiveness to public needs, see Henry v. FCC,
302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962), to justify use of a radio frequency. The FCC has expressed concern that the few stations operating in any market
provide the public with limited choice in programs and editorial viewpoints. See Editorializing by BroadcastLicensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
28 See text at notes 62-68 infra.
29 Witt, CATV and Local Regulation, 5 CAL. WEsrERN L. Rxv. 30 (1968).
a0 In 1950, Lansford, Pennsylvania had fewer than 8,000 inhabitants. NEWSPAPER ENTERPRise ASSOcIATION, WoRu, ALMANAc 287 (1970).
31 See Note, Regulation of Community Antenna Television, 70 CoLuis. L. REV. 837,
837-38 (1970). CATV systems operate by the reception of signals at a master antenna,
transmission through microwave relay systems or coaxial cables equipped with amplifiers
at set intervals, and distribution of the signals by cable to the viewers' television sets.
See, Comment, CATV Regulation-A Complex Problem of Regulatory Jurisdiction, 9 B.C.
IND. & Com. L. Ruv. 429 (1968).
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1959, the FCC completed its study of CATV and concluded that there
32
was no place within its jurisdiction for the regulation of CATV.
Cable TV soon moved into larger, more lucrative markets, evoking
protests from broadcast TV stations. By 1965, the FCC had decided
that some regulation of CATV was required, 3 and by 1966, the FCC
completely reversed its position of seven years earlier. 34 In asserting
jurisdiction over CATV, the FCC noted the "substantial competition"
of CATV with commercial broadcasting 35 and the probability that
cable had an adverse impact on commercial television. 3
This extension of jurisdiction was challenged in United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co. 37 The Supreme Court upheld the regulation
of CATV, giving an elastic interpretation to the Commission's jurisdiction that allowed it to regulate any medium of interstate communication affecting the FCC's policies. CATV reception and transmission
of signals was found to be interstate communication since much television programming is devised for national audiences. 38 The Court
then reasoned that although the Radio Act was originally enacted to
curtail interference, achievement of the goal required the FCC to allocate frequencies in an efficient manner to achieve maximum broadcasting consistent with no interference. 39 The FCC has stated that it
is necessary to promote the use of ultra-high frequency (UHF) and
educational television (ETV) in order to accomplish efficient use of
available frequencies. 40 Since the existence of cable television arguably
32 Inquiry Into CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-31 (1959).
33 Rules Re Microwave-Served CATV, First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 707-14
(1965). The Commission required cable systems using microwave relay to carry all local
stations and prohibited duplication of local programming within fifteen days. See Chazen
& Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The Visible Hand, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1820,
1825 (1970). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had upheld an
earlier FCC foray into cable regulation in Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC,
321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). In that case, the Commission
had denied a permit for the construction of microwave relay facilities to be used for
CATV operation on the ground that CATV would have an adverse impact on local
broadcasting.
The 1965 decision presaged further FCC action since it affected only 12 percent of
then-operating CATV systems, Comment, supra note 31, at 435, n.56, and since the decision
to invoke indirect jurisdiction was couched in language better suited to an assertion of
ancillary jurisdiction.
34 Rules Re Microwave-Served CATV, Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725 (1966).
35 See Rules Re Microwave-Served CATV, First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 707
(1965).
36 Id. at 713-14.
37 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
38 Id. at 168-69.
39 Id. at 173-74; see text at note 55 infra.
40 392 U.S. at 174-75.
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could have an impact on UHF or ETV and thus interference with
the FCC's method of promoting efficient use, the Court found that
regulation of CATV might be necessary to implement the policies of
the Communications Act. 41 It therefore followed, the Court held, that
42
the FCC must have ancillary jurisdiction over CATV.
III.

PAY-CABLE UNDER ANCILLARY JURISDICTION

In conjunction with its exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over CATV
systems, 43 the FCC has assumed jurisdiction over all pay-cable opera41 Id. at 175-77. The Court also noted that the Senate Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce feared that unrestricted growth of CATV would eliminate local broadcasting, listing four anticipated ill effects: (1) communities would be deprived of local

service; (2) suburban and rural areas might be deprived of all service; (3) residents of
central communities would be deprived of all service if unable to pay cable fees; (4) entire
regions might be deprived of local service. Id. at 175-76 n.43, citing S. Rep. No. 923, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1959). The Court did not indicate what weight it attached to these
statements of congressional fear of unregulated CATV.
42 892 U.S. at 177. After this open-ended grant of authority to the FCC, the Court,
somewhat mysteriously, explained that it expressed "no views as to the Commission's
authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any other circumstances or for any other
purposes." Id. at 178.
48 The FCC has employed its jurisdiction to impose a variety of restrictions on CATV
operation. Under the Commission's rules, CATV systems must carry the signals of all stations within thirty-five miles, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.5(f), 76.59,76.61, 76.63 (1972), and are prohibited
from carrying certain, more distant signals in preference to those of less distant stations.
47 C.F.R. § 76.61(b) (1972); see Comment, Regulation of Cable Television: The Federal
Communications Commission's 1972 Rules, 1972 ILL. L.F. 608, 616. CATV systems may,

however, carry foreign language stations and governmentally operated educational TV
stations free of these restrictions. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(c), (d), 76.61(d), (e) (1972). CATV
systems cannot simultaneously duplicate programming shown by broadcast stations entitled to exclusivity. 47 C.F.R. § 76.93(a) (1972). This provision is limited by the requirement that the station claiming exclusivity give notice to the CATV system. Systems in the
top 100 markets cannot carry any syndicated series within one year of its sale to a local
station if the copyright holder makes a proper claim of exclusivity. 47 C.F.R. § 76.151(a)
(1972). In the major television markets, cable systems are required to have at least twenty
channel capacity with as much bandwidth for nonbroadcast as for broadcast use, 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.251(a) (1), (2) (1972), to provide a minimum of four free and leased access channels, 47
C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(4)-(7) (1972), and, if the system has 8,500 or more subscribers, to
originate programming "to a significant extent," 47 C.F.R. § 76.201(a) (1972).
The origination requirement, one of the most costly requirements for CATV systems,
see Comanor & Mitchell, Cable Television and the Impact of Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGT. SC. 154 169-70 (1971), was upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972). The plurality opinion found the requirement to be
within the FCC's authority under its ancillary jurisdiction, pointing out that the rule
promotes program diversity just as the FCC does in its regulation of radio and television
broadcasting. Id. at 665-69. The opinion seeks to harmonize this result with the intended
reach of the Communications Act:
To be sure, the cablecasts required may be transmitted without use of the broadcast spectrum. But the regulation is not the less, for that reason, reasonably
ancillary to the Commission's jurisdiction over broadcast services. The effect of
the regulation, after all, is to assure that in the retransmission of broadcast signals
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tions and has adopted regulations to govern them4 4 while instituting
further rule making proceedings to consider modification of those
regulations. 45 The stringent restrictions proposed for subscription cable
46
are expected to diminish the competitive impact of that medium.
The FCC has not yet asserted jurisdiction over the screening of
first-run movies in hotel rooms, since the Commission believes that
the impact of such operations on commercial television is minor, but
has commenced rule making proceedings to determine whether regulation of this and related media is necessary. 47 SterlingManhattan Cable
Television, Inc. v. New York Telephone Co. 48 involved the operations
of Trans-World Communications, a division of Columbia Pictures that
viewers are provided suitably diverse programming-the same objective underlying regulations sustained in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
... , as well as the local carriage rule reviewed in Southwestern and subsequently
upheld. Id. at 669.
Chief Justice Burger, concurring, declared that the regulation "strains the outer limits of
even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions of the
Commission and courts," but concluded that the regulation should be upheld because
Congress has failed to enact specific legislation regulating CATV. Id. at 675-76. There
were four dissenters, Justices Douglas, Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist.
44 The regulations that the Commission has proposed to govern the showing of
television programs through cable with a per channel or per program charge include: prohibition, with limited exceptions, of cablecasting feature films that have had general release
anywhere in the United States more than two years prior to the cablecast, 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.225(a)(1) (1972), proscribing showing of sports events within two years of airing on
commercial television and of events, such as the Summer Olympics, that regularly occur
at intervals greater than two years, the last regular occurrence of which was shown on
commercial TV, 47 C.F.R. § 76.225(a)(2) (1972), a total ban on the showing of TV series,
47 C.F.R. § 76.225(a)(3) (1972), requiring sports events and movies to comprise less than
0 percent of cablecast hours, 47 C.F.R. § 76.225(a)(4) (1972), prohibition of commercial
advertising, 47 C.F.R. § 76.225(a)(5) (1972), and banning the showing of live or same day
delayed sports events of a type televised to the same community on a nonsubscription
basis during any of the previous five years, 47 C.F.R. § 76.643(b) (1972). If the sports
event occurs regularly at greater than one year intervals, the ban covers events broadcast
on commercial TV in any of the prior ten years.
The ;ule prohibiting cablecasting of old movies contains an exception under which one
film per month may be shown ten or more years after the film's general release; the film
may be shown more than once, but all showings must take place within a single week
each month. The rule also permits cablecasting of films that commercial television stations refused to show or that the film owner refused to let be shown by commercial TV
stations. The cable operator would, however, be required to make a "convincing showing
to the Commission" that the film owner and commercial television stations were unable
to reach agreement after "bona fide" attempts. 47 C.F.R. § 76.225(a)(1) (1972).
45 37 Fed. Reg. 15173 (1972).
46 Id. at 15174-75.
47 38 Fed. Reg. 2766 (1973). During the rule making proceeding, the FCC will focus on
the competitive effect hotel movies have on broadcast and cable TV, and will suspend the
restriction on what movies can be shown through pay-cable for hotel and motel viewing.
Id. at 2766-67.
48 26 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 610 (F.C.C. Jan. 17, 1973).
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leased closed-circuit video and audio transmission facilities from the
New York Telephone Company to provide screening of first-run movies
through the television sets in the rooms of five New York hotels. 4 9 Although the Commission concluded that such dosed-circuit movie showings were not presently within its jurisdiction, its opinion held open the
matter should competition grow, and also seemed to expand the nebulous limits of its jurisdiction. The Sterling opinion indicates that FCC
jurisdiction extends to wholly intrastate operations 0 and to activities
that affect operations, such as cable television, over which the Commission has only ancillary jurisdiction.51
Ancillary jurisdiction is founded upon the ultimate statutory goal,
the prevention of interference with transmission of radio signals. Although Southwestern indicates that the FCC has jurisdiction over
media that seem to pose a threat to free broadcasting, "to ensure the
continued economic vitality of free television"5 2 and to prevent "adverse impact on, or unfair competition to, the basic free television service, '53 the protection of free broadcasting is only a mediate goal.
The assertion of jurisdiction over pay-cable and the suggestion of
possible jurisdiction over closed-circuit hotel movies cannot be de49 At the time the FCC heard the complaint, based on Trans-World's failure to obtain
a certificate to operate a new communications line, see 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1970), Trans-World
had the capacity to carry live broadcasts and to interconnect with other closed circuit
operations or with cable television and had extended service to 29,000 rooms in six cities.
26 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 610, 613.
50 After explaining that there was no requirement for a certificate from the FCC for
the operation of the lines used by Trans-World since the lines were wholly intrastate, the
Commission went on to distinguish Trans-World's activities from cable television's, saying
that "cable television systems ... by definition are engaged in distributing broadcast signals" and citing the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros.
Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279 (1933), that broadcast signals by definition constitute interstate communications. 26 P & F RADio REG. 2d at 618. This distinction of
cable, had the Commission stopped there, would seem to place Trans-World's activities
beyond any jurisdiction the FCC could exercise, since even its ancillary jurisdiction had
been restricted to communications activities that were interstate, although perhaps only
by definition. The Commission, however, then based its refusal to assert either indirect or
ancillary jurisdiction on the complainant's failure to show that Trans-World's activities
had substantial impact on other companies' Commission-regulated operations. Id. at
620-21.
51 The Commission noted that: "Trans-World's proposals are directed to the showing of
motion pictures in hotels, and thus would not appear to have any impact on broadcasting
in the area and only limited possible impact on cable. We recognize that this picture
could change ....
At this time, however, we find no basis on this ground for asserting
jurisdiction." 26 P & F RADIo REG. 2d at 620-21.
52 National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 597 U.S. 922 (1970).
53 Cox, Competition in and Among the Broadcasting, CATV and Pay-TV Industries, 13
ANnTRusr BuLL. 911, 918 (1968).
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fended as necessary to prevent interference. Neither pay-cable nor
closed-circuit movie operation employs the radio spectrum, and, therefore, neither can physically prevent other uses of scarce resources not
presently allocated through market operation. In looking only to the
effect on commercial broadcasting, and through that to the effect on
distribution of and diversity among communications facilities, the
Commission has taken the criteria for frequency allocation as selfgenerating goals. 54 Yet even on the assumption that the mediate ends
are acceptable as ultimate goals, the argument for jurisdiction over
pay-cable is inadequate.
A.

Impact on Communications: Resources and Reason

It should be noted, first, that the argument for jurisdiction is circular; if the FCC desires to prevent an unregulated medium from adversely affecting a given aspect of communications, the FCC has
jurisdiction over that medium provided the Commission can devise
regulations that in fact prevent the adverse effect. The justification for
jurisdiction over pay-cable is that pay-cable would reduce commercial
television's revenues to such an extent that commercial stations would
be forced out of business, but that pay-cable, even in combination with
a CATV system engaged in distributing broadcast signals, would be
unable or unwilling to fill the void left by the broadcast stations' departure. 55 This justification is unavailing unless unregulated pay-cable
would have a significant impact on commercial stations' revenues.
Pay-cable could reduce commercial broadcasting revenues by siphoning either audiences or programs away from broadcast stations.
Some audience fragmentation can always be expected from the addition
of another channel to the pool from which viewers select. 56 The Commission has rejected audience fragmentation alone as a basis for preventing provision of a competitive station, in dealing with other
broadcasting matters, even though the fragmentation may result in one
competitor's failure.5 7 In that event, the audience-preferred competitor
will survive.
1. Programming.A more serious concern is that pay-cable will at54 See Coase, The Economics of Broadcasting and Government Policy, 562 AMER. ECON.
REV. 440, 446 (1966); Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television
Industry, 3 B=u. J. ECON. & MGT. Sci. 98, 124-27 (1972); Note, N.Y.U.L. REv., supra note 2, at
133. But see Kenny, Closed Circuit Television: What Place in Our Regulatory Framework?,
31 FED. BJ. 167, 177 (1972); Note, supra note 31 at 864-67.
55 See note 41 supra; Cox, supra note 53, at 918-19.
50 Park, Cable Television, UHF Broadcasting,and FCC Regulatory Policy, 15 J. I.w &
EcoN. 207, 208-09 (1972); Posner, supra note 54, at 103.
57 E.g., Southeastern Enterprises, 22 F.C.C. 605 (1957).
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tract programs with high viewer interest, requiring viewers to pay for
or forego programs they otherwise could have viewed free of charge.5
Many programs have shifted, without the FCC objecting, from one
commercial broadcast station to another, 59 but pay-cable is thought to
pose the threat of attracting all or nearly all of the most popular
shows.60 If pay-cable can do so, it must be for some reason other than
the "unfair" advantage allegedly possessed by CATV61 since pay-cable
proposes to originate all its programming, rather than to distribute
for a fee broadcast signals received without charge by the cable operator.
Under the present commercially sponsored system, "the person who
pays for the broadcast of a program is the advertiser. It follows that
the programs broadcast are those which maximize the profits to be
derived from advertising." 62 Commercial sponsorship means that the
3
viewer can consume television services without paying for them,
and, consequently, there is no measure of the intensity of viewer preference for particular programs. Pay television corrects these deficiencies
of commercial television by collecting a fee for program service rendered. The direct payment for programs creates a market for programs
separate from the market for advertising and allows the program producer to capitalize on the varying intensity of viewer preference for
different programming.
Since it is possible for the commercial television viewer to consume
the program without consuming the advertising by buying the advertised product,6 the amount the advertiser is willing to pay for a
program reflects the increased revenues to the advertiser of an additional sale diminished by the improbability of a viewer being induced
to purchase the product. For inexpensive products the worth of an additional sale is slight, while for expensive products the likelihood of
inducing a viewer to purchase the product is comparatively small. As
a result advertisers are willing to spend only a few cents per viewer.6 5
The minimal price per viewer necessitates an attempt to seek the largest
possible audience in order to cover production costs. The producer
58 Cf. 37 Fed. Reg. 15173, 15174 (1972).

59 R. HORTON, supra note 3, at 7.
60 See Brown, supra note 3, at 274-75.
61 Cox, supra note 53, at 918.
62 Coase, supra note 54, at 446.
63 Brown, supra note 3, at 268; Telser, Supply and Demand for Advertising Messages,
562 AMm. ECON. REv. 457, 459 (1966).
64 Telser points out that advertising has a value to consumers, reflected in the generally
higher prices of advertised goods, representing ease in finding products and perhaps increased confidence in or increased knowledge of the product. Id. at 457.
65 Posner, supra note 54, at 103.
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cannot seek a narrower audience with a high level of interest in a given
program, since that audience will also be worth but a few cents per
viewer to the advertiser. Pay television, on the other hand, can maximize its revenues by presenting programs to a smaller audience, each
member of which will pay more than a few cents. 66
It seems likely, therefore, that fears that pay television will capture
all of commercial television's most popular programs are unfounded.
The two types of television lend themselves to the presentation of essentially different types of programming. Pay television could present
programs for which there is only a small audience, but for which each
viewer is willing to pay a great deal; such programs-for example,
opera performances-are not now presented on commercial television.
Commercial television, on the other hand, can present programs that
attract a large audience, but for which each viewer would be willing
to pay relatively little. Such programs are probably unsuitable for pay
television since the program production cost and the administrative
costs of billing and collecting might exceed subscriber revenues. It is
probable that most programs shown on commercial television are of
this type.
There are two other categories of programming: programs for which
each member of a small audience would pay little and programs for
which each member of a large audience would pay a large amount.
Programs of slight interest that attract few viewers are unlikely to be
shown on either pay or commercially sponsored television. Programs
that attract relatively large audiences, and for which each viewer is
willing to pay a relatively large sum, are probably shown rarely, if at
all, on commercial television. If the value of the program to the viewer
is significantly greater than the program's value to the advertiser, then
other means of presenting such programs would be devised to capture
that difference. Closed-circuit telecasting of heavyweight championship
fights6 7 and theater screenings of movies are two examples. It is likely,
then, that pay television, instead of siphoning programs from commercial television, would present programs that are not now shown on
commercial television and are available only by losed circuit, if they
are televised at all.68
The same analysis is applicable to the regulation of operations such
as Trans-World's hotel movie scheme. Although the FCC concluded
that the scheme would have little impact on television, the Commission
seemed to attribute that conclusion to the restriction of screeings to
66 See id. at 104-05.
67 See Kenny, supra note 54, at 170-71.
68 See Posner, supra note 54, at 105-06.
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hotel rooms. 69 The real source of the lack of impact is that TransWorld's operation, like pay-cable, is financed by a mechanism different
from the source of commercial TV revenues and offers a different type
of programming.
2. GeographicDiversity. The Commission's concern with geographical distribution of communications facilities, like its concern with program diversity, originated with the need to allocate frequencies.7 0 Fear
that cable will have an adverse impact on dispersion of communications facilities, by eliminating local programming from smaller communities and importing signals broadcast from larger ones, springs from
the same notion of destruction of commercial broadcasting that underlies the Commission's argument regarding content regulation. But paycable's impact on station distribution, like its probable impact on programming, is apt to be opposite to that predicted by the FCC as the
predicate for its jurisdiction.
First, since pay-cable will not attract programming from commercial
TV, it is unlikely to reduce broadcast revenues significantly, thus
making an adverse effect on the distribution of television stations
unlikely. Furthermore, to the extent that pay-cable operates over the
same cable as CATV, the distribution of local television outlets will
be enhanced. As one FCC Commissioner has noted, "it is economically
and technically feasible for almost any community of appreciable size
to have its own CATV system, and hence its own local outlet, whereas
television broadcast stations generally require a substantial population
base ... .,"71 Some communities, however, are too small even for cable.
Cable operation in many locales involves heavy fixed costs for system
construction, particularly for purchasing and laying the cables.7 2 Although the operating costs for cable may be less than for broadcasting,"
the construction costs are sufficiently high to make many cable systems
not connected with subscription cable operations unremunerative. 74
Since cable has usually been used in the past to retransmit broadcast
signals, it has been engaged in providing the same type of program as
that provided by commercial broadcasting stations. Pay-cable will often
employ the same cable as that used for retransmission; cable system
09

See note 51 supra.

70 See text and notes at notes 8-27 supra.

71 Cox, supra note 53, at 919.
72 MrTE, INC., URBAN CABLE SYSrEMs (1972); RMC, INC., Cosr ANALYSIS OF CATV
COMFONENns (1972); Posner, supra note 54, at 112.
73 Note, supra note 31, at 843. But see Posner, supra note 54, at 103, suggesting that
costs for cable and broadcast operations are approximately the same.
74 See MrrRa, INC. supra note 72; RMC, INC., supra note 72; Comanor & Mitchell, supra
note 43, at 196; Park, supra note 2.
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owners will either supply pay-cable service themselves or lease channels
to a separate pay-cable firm. In either case, because it can provide programming different from that now provided by commercial broadcasting, 75 pay-cable can offer an additional source of revenue to cable
system owners. This might make profitable many CATV operations
that, without pay-cable, could not be built. By enabling hitherto submarginal CATV systems to operate, pay-cable will promote television
distribution by providing cable services to communities served by few
or no commercial broadcast stations.
The increased viability of cable may also increase the distribution of
communications facilities by improving the ability of UHF stations to
survive. Examinations of the effect of cable on UHF, both contemporaneous with the Commission's assertion of cable jurisdiction 76 and
more recently,77 indicate that, since it can improve UHF reception,
cable television is likely to aid, rather than impair, UHF stations'
development.78 UHF signals generally have an attractiveness index
of less than half the average for VHF,79 and only one in two sets
presently are equipped to receive UHF signals.80 The UHF audience
gain from improved and expanded reception via cable more than offsets
the audience diversion from UHF by cable's provision of additional
channels."' Although the necessity of using UHF channel allocations to
promote distribution of TV outlets is doubtful where CATV is available as an alternative, the FCC's policies with respect to UHF would be
advanced, rather than retarded, by pay-cable operation.
B.

Monopoly in Cable

Another argument for jurisdiction over pay-cable, as well as over
cable generally, is that regulation is needed since a single entity could
monopolize cable services for a community.82 This argument equates
cable with communications common carriers, which have been viewed
as providing services of an essentially "public" nature that could be
75 See text at notes 60-68.
76 M. SEDEN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COMaIMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION SYSTEMS AND
THE TELEVISION BROADCAST INDUSTRY 5, 84-86 (1965).
77 Park, supra note, 56; Park also cites studies by the Kaiser Broadcasting Co. and Neilson Co., the latter study commissioned by the American Broadcasting Co., as supporting
the conclusion that CATV is likely to benefit nonnetwork UHF stations. Id. at 225-29.
78 Id. at 222.
79 Id. at 250.
80 Posner, supra note 54, at 103.
81 Park, supra note 56, at 222.
82 This argument has not been made with respect to closed circuit operations such as
Trans-Word's.
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provided efficiently by only a single carrier.83 Absent government regulation the monopolist would charge a supracompetitive price. It is in
part to deprive the monopolist of this ability that common carrier
84
services are subject to regulation.
At least one study of cable services has concluded that cable, like
telephone service, has decreasing average costs in the relevant demand
region and is therefore a natural monopoly.8 5 If this is true, it is still
not clear why regulation of cable should come from the federal government. Cable is not an interstate operation, and various proposals have
been advanced for controlling cable's monopoly through state or municipal regulation.8 6 One reason the state or local government can
effectively regulate cable is that cable is a natural monopoly only within
87
small geographic areas.
The federal concern with cable is not the rates that cable operators
charge but the communications services that they furnish.8 8 Despite
the limited number of available communications channels, Congress
has not delegated, nor has the FCC advocated, power to regulate program rates. Although the FCC has displayed some concern over the
communications "monopoly" possessed by broadcast stations,8 9 this is
not a concern over enterprise monopoly; it is only a restatement of the
"limited resource" argument invoked to justify the government's partial regulation of program content.90 The limited number of channels
available results in limited choice in programs and editorial viewpoints.91 To ensure diversity, the Commission asserts the need for
83 See

S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), A. KAHN, 2 THE ECONOMICS OF

REGULATON: PPINCIPIrES AND INSTITUTIONS 119-22, 127-29 (1970).
84 See S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
85 Ohls, Marginal Cost Pricing, Investment Theory and CATV, 13 J. LAw

& ECON. 439,
444 (1970).
88 Id. at 446-48; Posner, supra note 54, at 113-24; Witt, supra note 29, at 41-43.
87 Cf. Ohls, supra note 85, at 442.
88 See Rules Re Microwave-Served CATV, First Report and Order, 88 F.C.C. 683 (1965);
Rules Re Microwave-Served CATV, Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
89 See, e.g., UHF Allocation, Fourth Report and Order, 41 F.C.C. 131, 185-37 (1951). A
different concern of the Commission has been with control by a single individual of a
number of communications outlets in a single locality. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.636 (1972). Since
antitrust laws are applicable to broadcasters, 47 U.S.C. § 313(a) (1970), Commission attention to this latter problem may be unnecessary. Cf. Cox, supra note 53, at 912.
90 E.g., Commission Policy on Programming, 20 P & F RAmo REG. 1901, 1906-14 (F.C.C.
Jul. 29, 1960). The Commission insists that since broadcasters have an obligation to broadcast in the public interest, which follows from the government's selection of the broadcaster to use one of the limited number of radio frequencies, the broadcaster's program
content must be subject to some FCC control.
91 See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 666-70 (1972); Editorializing
by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). Mayflower Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 333
(1940).
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regulatory jurisdiction. 9 2 If this is the predicate for regulation, however,
then cable television is the solution, not the problem, even though cable
is monopolized in any given locality. Cable has the technical capacity to
provide a large number of channels. Even if one entity owned all of
the channels, it would find it profitable to lease some of them to any
person or group wanting to present a viewpoint or program and willing
to pay the system owner to forego use of the channel. 3 Cable would
thus allow many different types of programming to compete with present broadcast stations.

94

The problem of enterprise monopoly can be dealt with by means of
the antitrust laws, which apply to broadcasters and cable operators.9 5
It is, in any event, distinct from the problem of insufficiently diverse
programming, upon which the FCC has relied for asserting jurisdiction
over pay-cable. Program uniformity, if caused by the scarcity of channels, will be promoted by cable and pay-cable. If, as seems to be the
case, the method of financing programming is responsible for program
uniformity, media such as pay-cable and closed-circuit television will
promote diversity. 96 In neither case would the purported need to
ensure diversity support assertion of ancillary jurisdiction over paycable or closed-circuit operations.
CONCLUSION

The Federal Communications Commission should use its present
rule making proceedings concerning pay-cable and hotel movies to
92 Cf. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 173-75 (1968).
93 Cf. Ohls, supra note 85, at 457-59.
94 To the extent, if any, that channel lessees pay for their own enjoyment of programs
rather than for the opportunity to profit from presentation of advertiser sponsored programs, the leasing arrangement could operate as a form of pay television. It is unclear
whether this would occur; the cost of leasing a channel, if channel time were not leased
in relatively small blocks, may be sufficiently high that no individual or group would
come forward to finance programming for its own enjoyment. This type of program
financing, however, has occurred at times in radio broadcasting. See, e.g., Trinity Methodist
Church v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599
(1933); Young People's Ass'n, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938).
95 47 U.S.C. § 313(a) (1970).
96 The existence of much unused spectrum space at the present time, however, belies
the notion that restricted channel availability is the key factor reducing competition in
programming. Posner, supra note 54, at 103. Instead, it seems that the method of financing
programming is responsible for the present program similarity. By depending on large
audiences to make advertising attractive to program sponsors, commercially sponsored
television places limits on the number of stations that can operate. Additional stations,
which must strive to present the same type of low-interest, high audience programming
presently broadcast, fragment the audience. Beyond a given level, fragmentation may
diminish audience size sufficiently that advertisers will turn to other media and program
revenues will decline below program costs. Id.
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evaluate its extension of jurisdiction to that mode of communications
and its suggestion in Sterling that it might also assert jurisdiction over
closed-circuit television. The Communications Act's regulation of
broadcasting was designed to provide a mechanism for allocating a
limited communications resource in which no private property rights,
prerequisite to the normal allocation process, had been recognized.
Congress thought federally supervised allocation necessary to eliminate
intereference and to allow efficient use of the radio spectrum. Legislative concern with diversity of programming and distribution of stations
reflected judgments as to the criteria the government should use in
allocating that scarce resource.
Media such as pay-cable and closed-circuit hotel movies involve no
such problem of resource allocation and thus fall outside the FCC's
jurisdiction under Title III of the Communications Act. The Commission, however, as part of a pattern of protecting commercial broadcast stations from competition by other media, has claimed jurisdiction
over subscription cable television and, while declining to assert jurisdiction over hotel movie screenings via closed-circuit television, has
indicated the possibility of future regulation if significant impact on
commercial broadcasting becomes evident. The FCC's concern with
the impact that media like pay-cable and closed-circuit TV may have
on commercial broadcasting, possibly hampering the Commission's
ability to achieve diversity of broadcast programming and appropriate
distribution of broadcast facilities, is misdirected. The Commission's
promotion of diversity and distribution derives originally from the duty
to parcel out a limited public resource; such promotion is not an
independent legislative goal. But even taking diversity and distribution
of communications facilities as goals, rather than standards for frequency allocation, jurisdiction over pay-cable and closed-circuit television cannot be justified, since these media are likely to promote,
rather than impair, their achievement.
Ronald A. Cass

